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Civil Society, Democracy, and Peace
Terry Boychuk

D

o democratic societies engender democratic states? Or, do democratic states engender democratic societies? Are democratic states
inherently more peaceful than other regimes?
In the 1990s, international agencies invested heavily in building
up civil society organizations (CSOs) in the developing world as the
leading edge of a broader campaign to promote democratic transformations of authoritarian regimes. In the case of Palestine, the intent
was to establish a democratic social foundation for an emergent political entity, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Within a decade,
much of the original enthusiasm for promoting democratic governance
through bottom-up initiatives had waned. Optimism for engineering
democratic cultures from below that would exert pressure upward for
state-level reforms had given way to more pessimistic assessments of
the potential for CSOs to induce political change. The dawning wisdom was that the political elites of non-democratic states had proven
themselves quite capable of co-opting burgeoning CSOs into reproducing existing patterns of governance. The relationship between state
and civil society seemed circular and self-reinforcing; non-democratic
polities beget non-democratic civil societies while democratic polities
beget democratic civil societies.
These perceived lessons of democracy promotion are nonetheless
highly sensitive to the underlying time frames that serve as the bases
for reflection. In the short run, it is reasonable to expect that the generative role of CSOs is largely latent. That is, CSOs can only fulfill their
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potential as agents of democratization once state-level reforms have
cleared a path to civic engagement from below, and presumptively,
such top-down reforms would be exogenous, originating in the international arena beyond state and civil society. By the same token, political elites are likely to keep in check any democratic impulses from civil
society in the near term, absent external pressures to democratize. In
the long run, however, the transformative potential of CSOs is more
likely to become manifest, or take on a life of its own apart from the
state. Consistent with this perspective, the following analysis stems
from the premise that democratization is a long-term historical process, not a sudden event. Ten years may exceed the life cycle of grants
from international donor agencies, but in historical time, it does not
capture the fullness of the alternating cycles of state-society dynamics.
Nor is democratization a mono-causal process. Multiple, coincidental,
and mutually reinforcing circumstances produce democratic movements, of which civil society is one element and not the sum and total
of democratic equations.
Although students of politics often disagree about how to model
the evolution of democratic governance through the interplay of state
and civil society, they more frequently share an image of democracy
as an instrument of peaceful resolution to rival claims to political rule,
one that generates a pacific aura permeating other realms of social
life. Nonetheless, historical experience has not demonstrated that civic
associations, voting rights, and competitive elections are sufficient in
and of themselves to guarantee social order. The increasingly popular
adage “No Peace Without Justice” is indicative of evolving doctrines
about the relationship between democracy and peace. Defining democratic rule narrowly in terms of formal rights of expression, association,
and advocacy in the classical liberal tradition (as debates about state
and civil society in the developing world sometimes do) overlooks the
profound lessons that have emerged out of the postwar reconstruction of democratic governance among the advanced industrial nations.
Modern liberalism has underpinned a long, unprecedented wave of
domestic prosperity and tranquility. It has done so by enlarging the
concept of democratic citizenship beyond the rights of individual and
collective participation in political deliberation. Substantive rights to
social equality and economic security have become foundations of
reformed democratic rule, and correspondingly, should inform our
understanding of the prospects for achieving peace through democratization.
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In the short run, international aid to enlarge the scale and scope of
civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is both
necessary and worthwhile. These initiatives, however, are not sufficient to generate democratic and peaceful engagement in the region.
The development of Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Israel
reveals the pivotal role of state institutions in defining the contours of
Palestinian civil society. Democratic laws, practices, and procedures
embedded in the institutions of government do appear to democratize
civil society as much as patrimonial-authoritarian rule blunts democratic forms of civic engagement. Consequently, reconciliation efforts
will require prolonged international support for reforming institutions
at both levels—renewing investments in Palestinian CSOs as well as
sustained pressure to institutionalize democratic rights in both Israel
and Palestine. In the long run, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict will
depend on adopting a more expansive definition of democratic rule.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Palestinian CSOs can play
an enduring role in sustaining democratic governance, provided that
democratization signifies more than a set of procedures for generating
and articulating preferences growing out of civil society. Democratic
co-existence will depend on a commitment to social equality and to
shared prosperity, not as the outcome of routinized democratic processes, but as a precondition of peaceful engagement between Arabs
and Jews.
This essay develops in three parts. The first provides an empirically grounded survey of CSOs in the United States. The purpose here
is two-fold. One is to sidestep much of the theoretical baggage that
generates exaggerated pessimism about the prospects for democratic
governance in Palestine specifically, and in the Arab world generally.
Reigning theories of civil society are more prescriptive than descriptive, more aspirational than operational. The more useful benchmark
for evaluating civil societies abroad is historical practice in the developed world, not hypothetical constructs; the former offers a more valid
measure of the vigor and import of CSOs elsewhere, and the latter,
a somewhat illusory one. The second is to identify the basic similarities between CSOs in the West and in Palestine. More specifically, the
branching of civil society into service, advocacy, and political divisions
observed in Palestine conforms to patterns observed in most nations. It
is not an aberration.
The second part offers an historical overview of Palestinian CSOs
in the West Bank and Israel. Comparing the experience of CSOs in
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these differing contexts provides insight into how political institutions
shape the development of CSOs. Two critical factors have informed
the dynamics of Palestinian civil society: the role of transnational and
international institutions and the immediate realities of democratic or
colonial rule. Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Israel both draw
extensively on international aid, directed primarily to social service
and advocacy CSOs. International donors are one of two main pillars
for CSOs and will likely remain so in the future; the other is government funding. In terms of political institutions, Palestinian CSOs in
Israel and the West Bank both operate within a context of abridged
civil and political rights. In Israel, Arabs can claim formal democratic
and civil rights—if not substantive ones—and so Palestinian CSOs in
Israel are versed in democratic proceduralism with a liberal-pluralist
bent. In the West Bank, the compromised foundations of PNA rule did
not augur well for democratization and set the stage for the rise of state
clientelism and political radicalization that has fragmented Palestinian
society.
The concluding section considers the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, given the bearings of Palestinian
CSOs. This discussion stems from two assumptions. The first is that
the status quo is unsustainable. The international community will
approach the limits of its tolerance for Israeli colonialism in the foreseeable future, and the evident contradictions of military occupation
will increasingly undermine Zionism as the controlling ethos of the
Israeli state. The second is that the ongoing transformation of Palestine
under decades of occupation is foreclosing the possibilities for a TwoState solution. Short of dismantling the extensive Israeli settlements
and the military apparatus now ingrained in the territories of the West
Bank, a reconstructed state unifying Israeli and Palestinian lands represents the more plausible route to a lasting peace. While the creation
of a bi-national state faces steep obstacles, the historical experience and
current achievements of Palestinian CSOs give grounds for cautious
optimism for arriving at a modus vivendi for an Arab-Jewish state.
*****
In light of current debates about civil society in the United States,
efforts to promote democracy in the developing world suggest a paradox. Western governments’ patronage of civil society organizations in
the Middle East and elsewhere aims to foster deliberative, representa-
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tive, and politically engaged collectivities. Presumably these CSOs will
curb the authoritarian tendencies of political leadership in such societies, and subsequently, engender norms of governance more conducive to the peaceful resolution of domestic and international conflicts.
However, mounting scholarship on civil society has documented the
erosion of the very patterns of democratic engagement in the U.S. that
development agencies and philanthropists imagine cultivating abroad.
Rather, the contours of civic life in the U.S. indicate points of convergence between American society and those in the developing world,
notwithstanding U.S. efforts to expand the scale and scope of participatory democracy elsewhere.
As many social scientists have observed, prevailing concepts of civil
society provide an idealized, not a realistic, description of collective
mobilization in the U.S. The longstanding importance of membership
organizations that encompass broad and diverse constituencies has
largely given way to professionalized, issue-oriented advocacy organizations divorced from popular influence or participation. Since the
1960s, upper-middle class, university-educated professionals have
generally displaced lay leadership of civic organizations. Grants from
well-endowed philanthropic foundations and wealthy donors, as well
as contributions raised by direct-marketing fundraising techniques,
have commonly replaced membership dues and membership volunteering as the material fundaments of contemporary political advocacy. Issue-oriented media campaigns, interest group lobbying, and
public interest litigation are the ascendant modus operandi of post-civil
rights era CSOs in the U.S. Broad-based social movements bent on
pressing reform through traditional channels, namely, direct participation in political parties or electoral campaigns, have waned. Nevertheless, politically active membership organizations have not wholly
disappeared in the United States. The most successful examples of
popular, grassroots mobilization in recent times belong to conservative
Christian organizations. Conservative churches constitute one of the
few remaining reservoirs of broad-based membership organizations
available for concerted political action, even though they carry strains
of ethno-religious nationalism that presents a challenge to secular, liberal-pluralist conceptions of U.S. democracy. The image of a two-tiered
civil society, one top-down and the other bottom-up, one secular and
the other religious, one professionalized and the other populist, often
permeates academic writings about civil society in the U.S.
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A third major branch of civil society in the United States is decidedly more apolitical in its leanings. It is comprised of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) commonly deemed charitable. These are charities that
deliver education, research, health and other welfare services, among
other activities held to benefit broad cross-sections of society. For
charitable NPOs, political partisanship and advocacy are secondary
to their service mission both in practice and in law. Not only do U.S.
laws place firm restrictions on their partisan activities, these charities
have become highly dependent on federal, state, and local government financing in the postwar era. Extensive government regulation
has arrived in tandem with extensive government funding, so much
so that the autonomy of these organizations—that is, their capacity to
respond to the communities that they serve as opposed to giving priority to aligning their activities with government mandates—has been
commonly exchanged for routinized public financing. It is now possible to speak of the étatisation of this branch of the nonprofit sector as
service-oriented charities operate more as extensions of public administration than as representatives of the citizenry. Some of these charities
have secular origins. Many have distinctive ethnic, racial, gender, or
religious affiliations. A great many are affiliated with what are called
mainline churches, that is, the liberal and moderate wings of American Christianity. Even though charitable NPOs act at the behest of the
state, government funding sustains highly pluralistic patterns of social
service provision.
For students and promoters of CSOs in the Arab world, an idealized
vision of civil society, rather than the mundane realities of the relationship between state and civil society in the West, often becomes the
benchmark for evaluating progress toward liberalization and democratization. That service-oriented NPOs are deeply indebted to government funding in the Arab world and have not served as rallying points
for debating government policies and practices is commonly interpreted as ingrained patterns of patrimonial rule rather than as striking
parallels to government-NPO relationships in the U.S. When Western
governments invest in highly professionalized CSOs in the Arab world
that espouse secular, liberal, and pluralist values, they often seemed
puzzled that these organizations do not snowball into broad-based
social movements for democratic reform, rather than acknowledge
the identical limits of political advocacy in the West situated upon a
similarly narrow popular base. That ethnic and religious identities
often provide the foundation for broad-based political movements is
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unreflectively dismissed as pathology as such, rather than a similarity
between U.S. and Arab polities that begs further analysis. The pivotal
role of ethno-nationalist and religious-based political parties in state
building in the West seems to have disappeared from the historical
memory of the political modernizers of the developing world.
Rather than take existing patterns of civil society in the Arab world
as the incomplete, flawed underpinnings of a democratic order, one
can identify them as recurring patterns across political regimes. The
three-fold division of CSOs detailed above encompasses the service,
advocacy, and political branches of civil society, and it widely obtains
across time and place. First, service-oriented CSOs are preoccupied
with the immediate charge of humanizing the social order: relieving
suffering and want, spreading literacy, propagating cultures of shared
norms, values, and beliefs, etc. They most commonly do so as beneficiaries of state patronage, but are not generally implicated in riskladen contests for political power in any direct sense. They are often
marbled with diverse class, ethnic, linguistic, and religious solidarities
and affiliations.
Second, advocacy organizations seek to influence state policy, but
not to govern. They typically do so as representatives of interested
minorities that do not command broad-based popular support. Liberal-pluralism is an ideology consistent with their vision of a social
order of many small fragments. They work to expand the sphere of
public dialogue and recognition to include a broader representation of
diverse interests and perspectives.
Third, the political branches of civil society are more directly
engaged in the struggle for rule. CSOs of this kind generate or channel
social solidarities broad enough to lay claim to the proximate status
of governing bloc, partnership in governing coalitions, or legitimate
opposition to ruling coalitions.
*****
Democracy is an elastic concept, so much so that students of political
science often attach prefixes and suffixes to the term to give it some
degree of precision. Every democracy removes basic issues of governance from democratic deliberation by way of constitution or convention. Furthermore, these pre-democratic foundations shape the nature
and scope of civil society. The antecedents of political rule in Israel
and the Occupied Territories have engendered differing kinds of civil
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society for Palestinians. Israel has highly developed democratic institutions (although prejudicial in their workings) that have afforded Palestinians the status of a recognized minority. Consequently, Palestinian
CSOs in Israel have evolved more clearly within a liberal-pluralist
mold. In the West Bank, military rule and the advent of limited selfgovernment have frustrated the nationalist ambitions of Palestinians.
These circumstances have favored the ascendancy of sharply edged,
ethno-religious CSOs in the Occupied Territories, more devoted to
resisting Israeli colonialism than to democratic governance.
Israeli democracy is grounded in two competing models of democratic governance. Israel is first and foremost an ethno-religious
nation-state. Secondly, its fundamental laws affirm a commitment to
liberal-pluralist democracy. The Declaration of the Establishment of
Israel affirms the creation of a Jewish state, asserting “the natural right
of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other
nations, in their own sovereign State,” but also “it will ensure complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective
of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture.” The a priori commitment to
upholding Jewish sovereignty is accorded priority in civic and political affairs. Nonetheless, the subsidiary commitment to minority rights
allows Arab-Israelis, who are 20–25% of Israel’s population, to construct an extensive array of CSOs. Palestinian civil society in Israel is
also bounded by perceived security needs. Israel is a colonizing nation,
established and consolidated in the face of resistance from Palestine
and other Arab nations. The state and the Israeli military view indigenous Palestinians as a potential fifth column. Therefore, Arab-Israeli
CSOs are suspended in a state of internal exile, largely insulated from
associations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other Arab nations.
Within the limited parameters granted to Arab-Israeli associations,
Palestinians have forged a civil society that resembles those of minority populations in the West in many respects. Service-oriented CSOs
have proliferated in Israel with the onset of neo-liberal reforms in the
1980s bent on privatizing public services. Those reforms have successfully delegated to NPOs primarily the responsibility for health and
human services. Palestinian charities are thus integral to the expanding mosaic of ethno-religious and secular welfare agencies underwritten by abundant government subsidies. Also consistent with the civic
practices of ethnic and religious minorities in the developed world, Palestinian advocacy organizations pressing for civil rights have grown in
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importance. Through conventional channels of interest group politics
(publicity, lobbying, and litigation), Palestinian CSOs have endeavored
to rein in official discrimination against Arab-Israeli individuals and
communities. This includes the attempt to stem the abuse of policing
powers directed against Palestinians arising out of the military’s broad
jurisdiction over civil matters. Arab representation in the Knesset, likewise, has promoted civil rights agendas, but also pressed for Israeli
recognition of Palestinian sovereignty in the Occupied Territories.
While Palestinian CSOs in Israel have primarily resorted to the
peaceful avenues of engagement afforded by quasi-democratic institutions, another salient characteristic of the civic order is the role of
international alliances. Arab-Israeli NPOs engaged in social service
provision and advocacy are deeply indebted to international agencies in the West that are devoted to humanitarian aid and supporting
human rights. Civic associations that bridge Arab and Jewish constituencies are rare or weak. The Zionist leanings of Jewish civic organizations have more commonly steered Arab-Israeli CSOs into partnerships
with international agencies to advance minority rights.
Appeals to liberal-pluralistic doctrines of democracy among Palestinian CSOs in Israel differ somewhat from the nationalist aspirations of civil society in the West Bank, as does the historical context of
rule. During the military occupation of 1967–1993, freedom of political
expression and association were minimal in the Occupied Territories.
Political activity was driven underground, operating under the guise
of cultural and social organizations tolerated by the military authorities because of their seemingly apolitical status. Thus, the charitable,
advocacy, and political branches of civil society were fused together
under the rubric of nominally charitable associations. Further, Palestinian CSOs were united in their determination to resist the occupation
and hasten the arrival of national self-government. The creation of the
Palestinian National Authority profoundly reconfigured civil society
in the West Bank. Charitable, advocacy, and political CSOs split apart
from each other, and they assumed roles of civic engagement more
typical of their counterparts in Israel and in other democratic states.
However, the foundations and subsequent evolution of limited home
rule fragmented Palestinian civic society in ways that did not bode as
well for democratic governance.
The PNA had conflicting mandates. For the Israeli government, the
PNA was a client state, fashioned in the interests of Israeli security,
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and charged with containing radical movements in the Occupied Territories. For Europe and the United States, the PNA was to lay the
groundwork for a democratic state that would evolve toward national
self-governance and peaceful coexistence with Israel. For Palestinians, the PNA was to deliver the Palestinians from Israeli colonial rule.
Added to the competing logics of security, democracy, and national
resistance was the incipient task of assembling the administrative infrastructure of political governance. The quixotic blueprints of Palestinian
self-government were bound to disappoint the expectations of the various stakeholders in the PNA.
Faced with the liabilities of launching a new state with uncertain
and conflicting sources of legitimacy, the PNA resorted to patronage to
consolidate a popular base of support. The charitable branches of Palestinian civil society became increasingly dependent on PNA funding.
Much of the international aid previously channeled to service-oriented
CSOs were now routed to, or vetted by, the PNA for redistribution. The
PNA offered badly needed financial assistance to Palestinian charities
in exchange for political allegiance to the reigning Fatah party. PNA
patronage was also systematically denied to rival factions in order to
appease U.S. and Israeli demands for marginalizing Palestinian organizations deemed threatening to Israeli security. The institutionalization of patron-client relationships between the Fatah-controlled PNA
and charitable NPOs fueled tensions between the PNA and the second
branch of civil society, advocacy CSOs. Commonly supported by Western donors, staffed with cadres of university-educated professionals,
and committed to liberal-secular democratic principles of government,
advocacy CSOs criticized the PNA for temporizing on democratic
reforms and for entrenching patrimonial forms of governance. They
feared that the PNA was institutionalizing corrupt political practices
that would eventually foreclose the possibility of democratic government. Thus, PNA governance drove a wedge between the charitable
and advocacy branches of Palestinian civil society.
Neither the favor of state-supported CSOs nor the discontent of
advocacy CSOs with the PNA would arbitrate the fortunes of Palestinian home rule. Popular dissatisfaction with the Oslo Accords and
its aftermath would ignite a second intifada and fuel support for the
political branches of Palestinian civil society associated with radicalized ethno-religious identities, culminating in the victory of the Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the January 2006 elections. Patience
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and goodwill toward the PNA have yielded to resentment of a political
system that has failed to stem Israeli military occupation and settlements in the West Bank. The PNA has not alleviated a deteriorating
economy nor cleared a genuine path to national sovereignty. The ensuing conflicts between Hamas and Fatah have left the Gaza Strip under
Hamas control and the West Bank under the internationally supported
emergency rule of Fatah. Palestinian society remains deeply divided.
Its political leadership is torn, as the saying goes, “between resistance
and governance.” The prospects for peace in the region seem as remote
as ever.
*****
In the short run, international assistance for civil society initiatives in
Palestine has made no clear impact on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is a major source of political instability in the Middle East
and the fault line of most East-West tensions in the world. International
aid for economic, social, and political development in Palestine has
provided an outlet for Western powers bent on evading the difficult
issues at stake in the conflict. Yet every incremental gain in peace and
prosperity attributable to international assistance for Palestinians has
been annulled by Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. As many
observers have argued, international assistance subsidizes the occupation by minimizing the costs to Israel of providing assistance for the
majority of Palestinians relegated to abject poverty in the Occupied
Territories. In this view, aid is now the problem, not the solution, insofar
as it abets Israeli policies.
There is a growing realization that investments in civic society have
reached the point of diminishing, vanishing, or even negative returns
in terms of generating partners for peace on either side of the ArabIsraeli divide. Yet this opens a window of opportunity to revisit basic
issues of governance in the region as a way forward. It may be that
political reform will move to the top of the agenda for international
stakeholders seeking avenues for a breakthrough to a peaceful settlement. Nonetheless, the options for a lasting and just peace are narrowing. A sovereign, viable Palestinian state may no longer be a credible
objective.
A bi-national state suggests another way out of the current impasse.
It is a plausible alternative to the crumbling appeal of Palestinian
nationalism. Specifically, a bi-national state could liberate an embar-
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goed economy that offers little hope of even modest affluence for the
mass of pauperized Palestinians, let alone self-sufficiency. It offers
the prospects of restoring freedom of movement and association for
a population currently imprisoned in dozens of small, disconnected
enclaves, and of participating in a state that possesses genuine sovereignty. For Israelis, a bi-national state promises relief from longstanding international isolation and condemnation without having to suffer
the dislocation of uprooting hundreds of thousands of settlers in the
West Bank or to surrender military control over the Occupied Territories. It presents an opportunity to end rule over a subject population
that recreates the very persecution that Jews have suffered elsewhere
and from which the State of Israel was to provide a safe haven. It
would lessen vulnerability to hostilities from surrounding states that
view Israel as an illegitimate entity because of its troubled history of
not accommodating Palestinian aspirations for political sovereignty.
Do the contours of Palestinian civil society suggest a constructive
role for CSOs in reaching a prospective settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict through bi-national statehood? There are reasonable grounds
for concluding that the latent potential of Palestinian civil society could
become a manifest force for democratic coexistence within the parameters of a bi-national state. As detailed above, the service and advocacy
branches of Palestinian CSOs present few obstacles to—or might even
facilitate—a reconstructed state. The prevailing tendency to delegate
direct responsibilities for social provisions to charitable NPOs (with
extensive government subsidies) could be easily reproduced without
far-reaching changes under a new dispensation. It would require few
revisions to sustain current practices. As importantly, it would provide a solid institutional basis for ethno-religious pluralism within a
bi-national framework of rule. Many of the divisive issues involved in
constructing a state-run, assimilationist system of education, health,
and social welfare services that have rent other nations could be sidestepped altogether by sustaining emergent practices. The liberal-pluralist ethos of advocacy CSOs in Palestine and Israel, once joined, could
lend aid and support to democratic engagement and provide a reservoir of leadership to reconstituted Arab representation within a new
political order. As for the political branches of Palestinian civil society,
the popular basis for bi-nationalism is a largely unexplored issue. A
broad-based re-examination of the nationalist ambitions is difficult
within the reigning orthodoxy of the two-state solution, but reconstructing hard-line versions of both Arab and Jewish national con-
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sciousness remains the most difficult challenge to resolving the current
impasse. For Arabs, recognizing the permanence of a Jewish presence
involves surrendering hopes of restoring historical Falastin, including,
but not limited to, setting aside expectations of reuniting the dispersed
Palestinian populations now residing in other states throughout the
region. For Jews, acknowledging the resolute determination of occupied Palestinians to reside in their homeland implies renouncing the
victory for a state under singular Jewish control, including, but not
limited to, abandoning the idea of Eretz Yisrael as a potential refuge
for Jewish communities throughout the world. Each would have to
compromise its image of ethnocracy for that of peaceful coexistence.
Both would have to recognize the inescapable reality of their common
future together, but as equal partners in a shared space.
Ideological barriers to democratic coexistence are not essentially
intrinsic to the peoples of Israel or Palestine. Ethnically exclusionary,
all-or-nothing versions of national liberation in the region are not necessarily self-sustaining, especially given that the social costs of maintaining them apparently far exceed any real benefits, as long as both
are fully internalized. However, the calculus of compromise or intransigence is not balanced within the limits of domestic resources nor
uniquely calibrated to the needs or wants of the peoples living within
Israel-Palestine. It is the externalities of the Arab-Israeli conflict that
enable, sustain, and exaggerate triumphalist nationalism, with the
balance weighted heavily in Israel’s favor. The missing partner for
peace—the one that tilts the costs and benefits of Arab-Israeli encounters in favor of continued aggression and against compromise—resides
elsewhere.
On the Arab-Israeli question, “The United States holds all the cards,”
as the saying goes. International deference to American interventions
in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wider Middle East means that the
opportunity for peaceful reconstruction of the region depends on the
currents of U.S. politics and the evolution of American foreign policy.
Israeli national ambitions expanded during the Cold War only with
the aid and support of the U.S. government. The generously rewarded
ally against Soviet influence in the region has now become the richly
endowed ally in the global war against terrorism. Absent a dramatic
reconsideration of American strategic aims—from one of forcible pacification of the region to that of bridging and reconciling Western and
Middle Eastern civilizations—Israeli nationalism will follow a similar
course. U.S.-Israeli ambitions are self-evidently expensive and onerous
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and ultimately self-defeating in the long run. If the U.S. realizes this
sooner rather than later, and reprises an awareness of the origins of its
own success in sustaining domestic peace and order, it could unilaterally reframe the terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and hand the moderates on both sides a long awaited victory. 
•
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